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Abstract 
This paper studies the race to the bottom in corporate income tax rates that has been argued to 
happen in federal or semi-federal structures and in particular in Canada and the EU, where the 
highest corporate tax rates have fallen from about 55 percent to approximately 35 percent since the 
mid 1980’s. Harmonizing tax rates across all the polities forming a common market space is often 
promoted as a way to avoid this “race to the bottom in taxes” and prevent a possible under provision 
of public goods.   This under provision signifies less income from taxes that is necessary for the 
government to receive in order to provide schools, health care and public infrastructure. On the 
other side a decentralized system where jurisdictions set their own rates is often supported because 
it should lead to increased efficiency in government spending and promote innovative forces in the 
economy. This empirical paper studies the decentralized system of Canada where the provinces set 
their own corporate tax rates.  It studies if Canada’s system of provincial tax rates could work as a 
guide for EU when considering harmonization of tax rates.  Declines in corporate income tax rates 
are usually carried through because it is presumed that tax cuts will lead to more Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).   Despite the sometimes weak relationship, this study shows that there is race to 
the bottom in corporate tax rates.  However, the race does probably not concern all other taxes 
which suggests that an under provision of public good will not be a problem.  A decentralized system 
as the one in Canada of corporate tax rates has the advantage of promoting efficiency in government 
spending through increased competition between jurisdictions.   
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1.1. Introduction 
Increased integration of markets all over the world signifies that firms are getting more and more 
mobile and jurisdictions will therefore compete against each other to get them to locate within its 
own borders.  The most popular tool of competition has been to cut corporate income tax rates to 
receive more investment, but if jurisdictions continue to lower their tax rates there will eventually be 
no taxation at all because of the fierce competition. If there is no income from taxes there will be no 
funds to fund the public good, which includes for example health care, roads and public education 
that we value in society.  On the other side, a lot of researchers today are supporting decentralization 
and more competition between jurisdictions.  This side believes that it will improve efficiency in 
terms of public spending and encourage innovative forces.  The increased efficiency combined with 
new ideas and solutions will promote economic growth and development.  
     Canada has a highly decentralized system that promotes competition in corporate income tax 
rates among the provinces and local jurisdictions have always had an important role in these taxes. In 
fact they were the ones, who introduced the taxes in the 19th century, but the responsibility of the 
taxes has changed throughout history and today it is a shared responsibility. When Canada 
experienced a major financial crisis in the mid 1990’s it caused the national government to give more 
power to the provinces and thereby increase the degree of decentralization.  After the crisis, Canada 
experienced one of the highest economic growths among the G7 countries and the decentralization 
has been seen as one of the main explanatory factors behind the growth (Clemens et al 2010, pp 67, 
79). However, there has been some movement towards more cooperation on taxes in Canada as well 
such as an agreement of calculating the taxable income according to a common formula. A common 
tax base results in a consolidated way of determining the taxable income, calculating the profit and 
then distributes the income across the jurisdictions that the firms are present in, instead of letting 
each jurisdiction calculate the profits on their own (Mintz, 2004). 
      In the EU as well as in the OECD-countries the issue of tax competition has mainly been seen as 
issue of concern and the policies taken has therefore been towards further cooperation in tax 
policies.  Looking at EU, there have been several steps since the late 1990’s towards a harmonized 
tax system because the difference between the member states is considered as a barrier of free 
competition (European Commission, 2011), giving for instance France that has the highest tax rate a 
disadvantage in comparison to Ireland that has one of the lowest rates (OECD, 2011). This year the 
Commission proposed a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) that implies a common 
definition of the taxable income that is very similar to the Canadian one (European Commission, 
2011).  
     The idea of a unified Europe goes back to the Roman Empire, but one could question if it could 
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and should be unified in terms of corporate taxes.  At a first glance a comparison of one state, 
Canada and a union of 27 different countries might seem peculiar. But in fact Jean-Monnet, one of 
the three co-finders of the European Union visited Canada in the early 20th century and was very 
much inspired by the country’s unique form of federalism. He realized that Canada’s Confederation 
was a practical and business-like successful relationship1 . Canada’s development of fiscal 
decentralization could enable other countries or unions such as the European Union (EU) to 
determine to what extent it should allow the jurisdictions to keep their responsibility of the taxes 
(Grewal, 2010). 
1.2 Purpose 
This paper will investigate if a decentralized integrated market in terms of tax rates will lead to a race 
to the bottom and an under provision of public good, that is a fall in government revenue as 
measured by percentage of GDP . In related to this it will study if a decentralized federal or semi-
federal market could promote efficiency and innovation, making harmonization of tax rates less 
attractive.  The focus will be on Canada, since this should be quite an integrated market combined 
with a high level of decentralization.  The provinces set their own corporate income tax rates, but 
most provinces have a common definition of the tax base.  The tax rates differ across the provinces; 
the Atlantic Provinces have moved from a general tax rate of 52 to 31 percent between 1986 and 
2011. The current rate makes the Atlantic Provinces a high-tax jurisdiction compared to the low-tax 
jurisdiction of British Colombia.   British Colombia moved from a rate of 53 percent in 1986 to 27 
percent in 2011. EU faces a similar situation to the one in Canada, but the question is if it should 
extend its cooperation further.  Canada has a long historical experience of multi-jurisdiction 
competition and EU should have a lot of learn from Canada when considering the future efforts of 
harmonizing the corporate income tax.   
The purpose of the thesis is to study what EU can learn from Canada in terms of harmonizing 
corporate income tax.  This will be invested by testing two opposing hypothesis, one coming from the 
policy-makers that promote harmonization of tax rates to avoid a “race to the bottom” and one that 
has its origin in the research of the Tiebout Model,  Montionola et al (1995), Besley and Case (1995) 
and Oates (1999) research on the benefits of decentralization.  
Hypothesis 1: Harmonizing corporate tax rates is necessary to avoid a race to the bottom and under 
provision of public good. 
                                                          
1
 Interview with Mr Noë, 2011-09-06 
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Hypothesis 2: Decentralization of corporate income tax promotes efficiency and innovative 
competition that encourage economic growth.   
 
1.3 Relevance of the Study 
The European Commission has conducted a lot of research of tax competition between the member 
states and moved towards further cooperation in the corporate tax field. Mintz (2004) found that EU 
can actually learn a lot from Canada when considering a common tax base. A common tax base has 
now been purposed by the Commission, but should EU limit its harmonization to only the tax base or 
should it harmonize the tax rates as well? Clemens et al (2010) found that the secret behind Canada’s 
strong economic performance has been the decentralization process and the competition between 
the jurisdictions.  Canada has a much longer history of an integrated market than the EU and 
therefore has a longer experience of tax competition. This study therefore contributes to the existing 
literature by studying if the decentralization in Canada is a case that EU can learn from or if it should 
be avoided to prevent a race to the bottom in tax rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Literature Study and Interview with Key Informants.   
This paper will be a combined literature review and field study in form of interviews with key experts. 
By doing a literature review I will give an overview of the main research ideas within the field of 
decentralization and the issue of tax competition, using a wide range of reports that has been 
published in well-established journals.  This literature review will be supported by interviews with 
some experts in the field of tax competition or political issues in Canada and EU. These interviews 
will enable me to draw conclusions from some primary data and hopefully give some new insight to 
the field of tax competition. The interviews were conducted in a period of one month during an EU-
Canada Study Tour between the 4th of September and the 2nd of October. During this time I had the 
opportunity to visit the EU headquarters in Brussels and six of the biggest cities in Canada. I visited 
organizations at regional as well as governmental level to get a in-depth knowledge of Canada as a 
federation. I listened to over 100 presentations of political, economical and cultural issues in Brussels 
and Canada.  After some of these presentations I was able to interview nine different experts at the 
following organizations: 
- British Colombia Film Commission  
- Canadian Conference of Social Development 
- Canadian Labor Congress 
 - European Commission 
 -Government of Ontario 
- Institute for Research on Public Policy 
- Institute of Government Studies in Victoria  
- Macdonald-Laurier Institute 
 
2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
I choose semi-structured interviews because of the wide range of different key informants 
interviewed.  It enabled me to adjust the interviews depending on the key informant which enabled 
me to get more out of the interview compared to a structured interview.  But the fact that they were 
somewhat structured implied that it was easier to focus on my aim for the thesis and structure the 
results. The key results were structured in table that can be found in Appendix 9.1. A semi-structured 
interview have the advantage that the respondent can give their own answer to a question rather 
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than having to chose between a set of pre-prepared answers. (Kvale, 1997, pp. 121-125). The main 
question that was used during the study was: 
 
- How would you describe the degree of competition between jurisdictions? 
- What is the effect of tax competition in terms of corporate income tax? 
- How are the relationships between the jurisdictions and the relationship between different levels of 
governance? 
 
2.3 Quantitative Data 
In order to support my empirical data I will use some statistics to show the development of tax rates 
over time and to get a good view of the current tax rates. The OECD data will be used to show the 
relationship between corporate income tax rates and FDI I use some data to get some general 
information about Canada and the EU from the World Development Indicators (WDI), Centre of 
Intelligence Agency and data on the Ethnic Fractionalization Index from Fearon (2003).   The 
historical data on the combined provincial and federal corporate tax rates are from Mint and Smart 
(2003) which will be combined with data from the Canada Revenue Agency to receive the current tax 
rates.  Since the Canada Revenue Agency does not collect their corporate tax revenues for all 
provinces, I will combine it with some of the data for Québec and Alberta that has been published by 
the Government of Alberta.   I will also use some data from Grewal  (2010) to show the development 
of shares of income taxation revenue in total taxation revenue.  Finally, I will use the WDI by the 
World Bank to define the size of the public good that is provided that is the government revenue as 
measured by percentage of GDP. There are also other measurements to decide the level of public 
good, such as taxes/GDP, social expenditure/GDP or the expenditure on certain areas (i.e. health 
care and public education). But because of the challenge of finding aggregated data for the EU as a 
whole and not only on the member states, I chose the WDI.  
 
 In brief the following sources of quantitative data will be used: 
- Canada Revenue Agency 
- Centre of Intelligence Agency 
- Fearon (2003) 
- Government of Alberta 
- Grewal (2010) 
- Mintz and Smart (2003) 
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- OECD Statistics 
- World Development Indicators  
 
2.4 Validity and Reliability  
This study is a qualitative study and the purpose of it is therefore not to be objective. The aim of the 
study is to give a broad perspective on the subject of tax competition and in this way test the 
hypothesis in a reliable way. One challenge in doing a qualitative study including interviews is that 
the issue of the result of the interviews will be influenced by the researcher’s own interpretation and 
background knowledge of the subject.  This question of validity, if the researcher actually 
understands the situation and information given in a correct way can be strengthened by awareness 
of its own influence ( Flick, 2002, pp. 221-222) 
     The interviewed experts in this paper are considered to be reliable since they are employees with 
key positions in their respective organizations.  Even though they have a great knowledge of the field 
it does not imply that they are objective because they are very much influenced by their institution 
or industry. The reliability has therefore been strengthened by comparing the outcome of the 
interviews with trustworthy research in terms of literature reviews and other experts’ opinion.  Some 
of the opinions given did contradict each other, but this is also the general situation of the subject of 
tax competition, it is a field of many opposing views.  Due the intense schedule of the tour and the 
limited amount of time I was only able to capture some of the major experts of the field. A lot of 
other key informants could be considered, such as a wider range of different businesses’ perspective 
or the opinions of governmental representatives in other provinces such as Alberta that is an 
important economic player. However, the interviews should only be seen as a complimentary 
material to the literature review.  The literature taken into account has been considered reliable 
because of the use of well-known sources and the additional support given from the experts that 
could support the material.  
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3. Background 
 
This chapter begins with outlining some basic facts about EU and Canada as a whole to get a general 
picture of the unions before studying the theory behind tax competition. The aim of this section is to 
give an overview of the decentralization process in Canada and explore the movement towards 
cooperation on corporate income tax in the EU.  
 
 
3.1 The Characteristics of EU and Canada 
In order to understand the relevance of comparing Canada and the EU it is important to understand 
the basic features of the unions.  Canada is about twice as big as the EU, but with a population of 
only 34 million compared to EU’s 500 million inhabitants as seen in the following table.  These people 
are spread over 10 provinces and 3 territories respectively 27 member states, see Appendix for map 
of Canada and its provinces/territories. But about 90 percent of the populations in Canada live within 
two hours drive from the US border.  In the EU there is quite a different situation, even though there 
are some Nordic countries that have a very low density of population as well.  EU has 23 official 
languages which can be compared to Canada’s two official languages. But the number of official 
languages does not tell us all about the ethnic diversity; in fact Canada is often described as a melting 
pot of different nationalities and has an ethnic fractionalization index of 0.59. This index measures 
the probability that two random selected individuals in a country do not belong to the same ethnic 
group and can be compared to for example the most ethnic diverse country in Western Europe, 
Belgium that has an index of 0.57 or a country such as Sweden that as an index of 0.19 (Fearon, 
2003).  Both Canada and the EU has a high GDP per capita compared to the rest of the world, but 
Canada has quite a lot higher GDP/capita as well as GDP growth per year which is in line with the 
country’s last decades of good economic performance.  The fact that they are both two common 
markets with a lot of competition between the jurisdictions and spread over a great geographic 
distance makes these unions good units to compare with each other.   
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Table 1: Basic Facts of EU and Canada 
 EU Canada 
Jurisdictions: 27 Member States 10 provinces, 3 territories 
Languages: 23 official languages  2 official languages 
Population: 500 million inhabitants 34 million inhabitants 
Area:  4.5 million square kilometers 9.9  million square 
kilometers 
GDP/capita: 32 365 USD  46 148 USD  
GDP growth/year 1,9 % (2010) 3,1 % (2010 est) 
Long-term  
unemployment: 
35 % of all women (2009) 
33 % of all men (2009) 
7 % of all women (2009) 
8 % of all men (2009) 
Life Expectancy: 82 years, women 
77 years, men  
83 years, women 
78 years, men 
Source: WDI (2011), CIA(2011) 
 
3.2 Canadian Federalism 
In 1867 Canada’s constitution was established in the British North American Act with two levels of 
government, the federal and the provincial (Grewal, 2010). The provinces were quite independent, 
but this changed somewhat in 1950’s with the introduction of “national adjustment grants” to 
equalize the opportunity to fund public good across the provinces (Bordo et al, 2011).  
     Canada went through a successful decentralization process in the mid 1990’s after very serious 
debt crises.  The debt crisis was a result of two decades of budget deficits and eventually, in the early 
1990’s the economy collapsed because they would no longer receive any more money to finance the 
loans taken earlier (Clemens et al, 2010, pp. 67).  In 1995 the federal government undertook a series 
of reforms in order to reduce its budget deficit. The federal government was reduced in terms of 
both its spending power and its employees. The vision was a smaller and smarter government.  The 
federal government had lost control over its own spending on social services due to cost-sharing 
agreements between the federal level and the provinces.  In the new agreement the provinces would 
receive more control over its spending and the government would put certain standards on the social 
services that had to be upheld (Clemens et al, 2010, pp. 72-77). The fact that the greatest budget 
cuts were now done at provincial level implied that a lot of intergovernmental conflicts were avoided 
(Cameron and Simon, 2002). 
     The constitution in itself has not changed, but in reality the provinces have access to the most 
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valuable taxes, such as corporate and personal income taxation. The federal government has the 
responsibility of all direct taxes, in practice taxes concerning customs, pensions and unemployment 
insurance (Shah, 1995).  
     Corporate income tax started as an issue of pure provincial concerned, but this has changed over 
the years. The first income tax was introduced in British Colombia in 1876, which was soon followed 
by other provinces and finally by the federal government in 1917.   The federal governments reached 
an agreement with the provinces during the Second World War that they would temporarly take 
over the corporate taxes in return for continuously assistance on rental payments (Bélanger, 2001).  
The federal government wanted to keep the control after the war, but Québec and Ontario re-
captured the control shortly afterwards. In 1957 the Rental Agreements between the provinces were 
replaced with Tax Sharing Agreements.  All provinces except Québec agreed to harmonize their tax 
base and to follow the federal tax rate in return for free federal collection of the taxes. The new 
agreement also offered abatements or reduction in federal taxes to facilitate provincial taxation of 
corporations. (Grewal, 2010) 
      The federal share of the total tax revenue has decreased continuously since the Rental 
Agreements, but the biggest change occurred between the early 60’s and the mid 80’s. The federal 
share decreased from 63 percent in 1961 to 51 percent in 1985. In 2007 the federal share was about 
49 percent of the total tax revenue (Grewal, 2010. Fiscal equalization transfers was introduced in 
1957 between richer “have provinces” to poorer “have-not provinces” due to the difference in tax 
revenue capacity (Grewal, 2010).  According to Oates (1999) this transfers are one of the major 
factors that holds the country together.   
     In the last decades provinces have gained strength in their relationship to the government. The 
government today works together with provinces in forming national policies, rather that everything 
is decided from federal level in Ottawa (Cameron and Simon, 2002). Many provinces are taking a 
more active role internationally which can be seen in the CETA-negotiations (Comprehensive Trade 
Agreement) between the EU and Canada. The provinces are a part of the negotiations from the 
beginning which is quite unique in international trade negotiations.  
     
3.3 Cooperation on Corporate Income in the EU 
In the “Tax Policy in the European Union” from 2001 the Commission states that member states are 
free to decide over their own taxation systems. This is the basis of the union’s position on tax policy. 
But there are a lot of reservations in this policy, because taxation can in many ways prevent free 
movement of goods, services, labor and capital, the founding principles of the EU. Measures can 
therefore be taken at EU level if the problems cannot be solved by the member states alone, harmful 
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tax competition is such an area because it can prevent cross boarder activities and economic activity. 
Harmful tax competition is one of many steps in promoting good governance among the member 
states, other steps are cooperation in; administration and information exchange, fiscal state aids and 
transparency (European Commission, 2011).  
    The fight against harmful tax competition begun in 1997 when the Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) adopted “Code of Conduct”, to prevent this kind of competition. The aim 
was to prevent countries to give some businesses unfair tax advantages by offering them tax 
incentives that were more favorable than the general tax level in the member state (European 
Commission, 2011). At the same time the issue of harmful tax competition was dealt with in the 
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development). The organization had created a 
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices after publishing “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue” in 1998. The report focused on harmful consequences of tax havens and certain tax systems in 
OECD as well outside the group (OECD, 1998).  
     In 2009 the Commission adopted a Communication report to the Council on good governance in 
terms of taxes. Good governance was defined by the ECOFIN on May 14, 2004 as “principals of 
transparency, exchange of information and fair competition” (European Commission, 2009; pp. 5).  
This Communication once again underlined the importance of transparency and information since 
the lack of it facilitates tax fraud and tax avoidance. Given the current wave of globalization in terms 
of increased integrated economic market, EU had to make sure that bilateral agreements are 
undertaken. The purpose of the cooperation has been to improve governance through fair 
competition. Good governance was covered by a few main areas in this Communication report, 
namely improving good governance within EU and to assist other countries with tools to achieve it. 
Finally, it also opted for more coordinated action with other international organizations such as 
OECD and the UN to extend the geographical areas (European Commission, 2009).  
     A major goal of the Lisbon treaty is that the member states of the EU should be more competitive 
and the Commission has stated that reforming the tax system is necessary to achieve it (McLure, 
2008). This was the beginning of the work towards the system of CCCTB that was finally purposed in 
March 2011.  The aim of the CCCTB is to reduce the administrative costs by offering one regulation 
instead of 27 different ones and in this way also reduce uncertainty of interpreting different juridical 
systems. The system is not only estimated to save businesses within the EU a huge amount of money, 
it is also seen as a way of increasing foreign investment in the region. The formula does not say 
anything about a common tax rate among member states since this would have perceived as too 
much interfering of the sovereignty of the member states (European Commission, 2011).  The 
Commission has stated many times that this is neither in their or the business community’s interest.  
It states that competition to some degree is good because it constrains the government from 
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becoming too big and is good for the competitiveness for businesses (McLure, 2008). According to 
McLure (2008) improved transparency with the CCCTB formula might also increase tax competition 
because it makes the difference in tax rates more obvious.   
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4. Theory 
 
The corporate tax rates have decreased substantially around the world the last decades. In EU as well 
as OECD it seems like the theory of a race to the bottom has gained a lot of credibility. There is a 
tendency towards harmonizing taxes to prevent countries in competing against each other in a race 
towards zero taxation, something that would create an inability to finance public good. On the other 
side there is an extensive research that are in favor for decentralization as a tool for economic growth 
because it leads to better governance and more efficient provision of public good because states 
compete against each other for investment. This section will outline two opposing hypotheses of 
decentralization and tax competition. 
 
 
4.1 Decentralization – A Race To the Bottom 
 
The race-to-the-bottom-argument relies on the assumption that states compete against each other 
for capital to promote creation of new jobs and economic growth. Jurisdiction will therefore lowering 
the tax rates to inefficiently low rates to attract investment. The phenomena of a race to the bottom 
arises from New Jersey’s dominate role as a location for corporations in the end of the 19th century. 
New Jersey became the major location for firms in the States through lowering registration fees for 
companies and declining franchise fees. By 1904 New Jersey had to make some major investment in 
infrastructure and lowering corporate income taxes became less prioritized since the state was more 
concerned about raising revenues for financing its investment (Grandy, 1989). Many other states 
tried to copy New Jersey’s strategy and in the end Delaware took over the leading position (Yablon, 
2007).  
     The traditional view seems to be that this is the first historical evidence of a race to the bottom, 
but there are others who believe this in fact was a race to the top in establishing corporate laws.  
This relates to New Jersey’s reform in the 1890’s in well-functioning corporate laws which resulted in 
greater innovation and better structured corporate powers. These laws are today seen as important 
regulations to promote efficiency and can also be found in Delaware that is the current leader in 
location for publicity traded companies (Yablon, 2007). Just by looking at the last decades 
tremendous decrease in corporate tax rates of the EU and Canada suggests that the same thing is 
happening today.  
     According to Kyrarciou and Roca-Sagalés (2011) study; fiscal decentralization should not be 
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combined with political decentralization because it increases the risk for local politicians; in power of 
the fiscal resources to use its power to win favorable electoral outcomes. Fiscal decentralization 
combined with shared decision-making also makes it difficult to hold different levels of government 
accountable for its decision since each level could blame the other level of government (Kyraciou and 
Roca-Sagalés 2011). 
     The theory of race to the bottom seem be something that is taken seriously at the political arena 
(Oates, 1999 ). The increased mobility of capital and the integrated market within the EU makes it 
relative straightforward to think that corporate income taxes have to be harmonized. If countries do 
not cooperate they will continue to cut the tax rates, in the end reaching zero taxation and thereby 
no income to finance the public good.   
Considering the above literature we would expect the following hypothesis to be true:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Harmonizing corporate tax rates is necessary to avoid a race to the bottom and under 
provision of public good. 
 
4.2 Improving Governance Through Decentralization and Competition 
 
There is a vast amount of literature on the impact on fiscal decentralization on government quality. 
One argument in favor for decentralization is that it constrains the government not to take 
advantage of its own power and a possibility to “control the leviathan”. Most literature that studies 
the relationship between fiscal and political decentralization and the quality of government finds that 
fiscal decentralization improves quality of government. This is in line with the findings of Kyraciou 
and Roca-Sagalés (2011) that studied the relationship using data from the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators. 
     There is a big dilemma between the importance of sufficiently strong central government that can 
enforce property rights and the fact that a strong government is strong enough to take away too 
much wealth from its citizens through various methods such as taxation. The difference between a 
sub-national and a national government is that a sub-national government is able to make credible 
commitments because it is induced by competition between other local governments. 
Decentralization therefore seems to be a way of solving the dilemma by interjurisdictional 
competition that controls the government spending (Montinola et al, 1995). Montionola et al (1995) 
takes up a series of different conditions for this “market preserving federalism” to function, one of 
them being that the jurisdictions have to manage their financial problems of their own. They cannot 
rely on assistance from the national government, because they need the incentive to keep their 
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financial resources in balance.  But Montinola et al (1995) also emphasize that neither complete 
centralization nor decentralization is good since it takes away the imbedded intuitional constrains 
that keeps a check on the governments.  
     One classic model that highlights the benefit of decentralization is the Tiebout model from 1956. 
The model can be used to argue in favor for decentralization because it predicts that every individual 
or in our case firm will move to the jurisdiction that has their preferred perfect balance of taxation 
and public spending. The reason why we do not see this in reality is the strong assumptions of the 
model and that there are costs associated with the ruling of a government in itself. Some of the 
assumptions are no mobility cost, full information about the other region’s tax-rates and that there 
are no external effects from public spending, that is, what is done in one municipality does not affect 
another (Hindriks, and Myles, 2006, pp. 164-166). 
     Besley and Case (1995) developed a theory of yardstick competition between jurisdictions through 
an empirical investigation where they studied re-election of governors between 1960 and 1988 in the 
United States. Their study is build upon the assumptions that there is asymmetric information 
between voters’ and politicians’ knowledge. It is only the politicians that know the true cost of the 
public good and thereby the necessary taxes to finance it. In a world of multijurisdictions the voters 
will compare its region’s taxes with other regions’. If a politician wants to be re-elected it will 
therefore have to take into account its own tax policy as well as its neighboring jurisdictions. It will be 
more difficult for politicians to overcharge its citizens for providing the public good. This result is not 
in line with the Tiebout-model. According to the Tiebout model; the individuals or in our case firms 
will move to the jurisdiction that has the preferred tax level. An increase in tax-rate should therefore 
only affect the movement of individuals and firms (Besley and Case, 1995). 
     The demand for public goods varies across the country and a local government can better meet 
the local preferences of the provision of public good. The welfare gains of decentralization are 
therefore higher with perfect information about the local conditions.  But with perfect information 
and the possibility to provide different levels of public good in different jurisdictions, there would be 
no need for local governments because the national government could meet this difference on its 
own. However, in world with imperfect information the local governments should be closer to their 
citizens and decentralization would lead to gains in welfare. In addition to the lack of information 
there are often political barriers that prevent the government from distributing a non-uniform 
degree of public good across the country. Oates (1999) also emphasis that even though the Tiebout 
model relies on the mobility assumption, this does not imply that there is no welfare gains in the 
absence of mobility. It is simply enough that there is a difference of preferences across jurisdictions 
(Oates, 1999). 
Oates (1999) and the Tiebout model show that fiscal decentralization makes it possible to satisfy 
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heterogeneous preferences and thereby avoiding intergovernmental conflicts. Canada has succeeded 
with this to a large extent through allowing a flexible solution for some jurisdictions, often including 
Québec, instead of forcing a unified agreement. After the Second World War the Québec 
government refused to enter tax collection agreement with the government for corporate and 
personal income taxes. Alberta started to collect its own taxes later than Québec and Ontario 
(Grewal, 2010). 
     One important factor to keep in mind about the logic behind the existence of a race to the bottom 
is that the hypothesis relies on very strong assumptions. First of all it is assumed that jurisdictions 
and not the firms are price-takers in the capital market. It is also believed that politicians truly seek 
to maximize the welfare of the state. In reality politicians might be more interested in maximizing 
their budget and to receive short-sighted benefits it might sacrifice environmental standards, which 
is not optimal in a welfare perspective.  Finally one assumes that the politicians have the right 
instruments to reach the policy goals (Oates, 1999).  
     Baldwin and Krugman (2004) study the effects of agglomeration forces on tax competition. They 
set up a model where some European countries are divided into “core nations” (Germany, Benelux, 
France and Italy) and “periphery nations” (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland).  The core group had 
relative steady corporative income tax rates between 1965 and 2000, while the less industrialized 
periphery group lowered their tax rates. It suggests that something far more complex is going on. 
      In the model of Baldwin and Krugman, the wealthier states will have a more advanced 
infrastructure and agglomeration advantages which will make it more attractive for industries to 
locate in these countries. The government of the core countries is assumed to be aware of this 
advantage and can therefore tax its industries at a higher rate, but still low enough to prevent the 
industries from moving to the periphery countries. It also has the effect that periphery countries will 
set their tax rates based on purely domestic concerns; since they are aware of that they cannot 
compete with the core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).  However, if this is true, this does not fully 
explain the decrease of the tax rates for the periphery countries and looking at the statistics from 
2011 on corporate income tax rates that can be found in the next section it is clear that tax rates in 
all countries have decreased a lot.  
     This literature section suggests that there are many benefits of decentralization such as increased 
efficiency and the possibility to satisfy heterogeneous preferences for public good.  It supports 
autonomy of fiscal decisions for the member states of the EU and competition between jurisdictions 
instead of harmonization of tax rates. We would thus expect the following hypothesis to be true:  
Hypothesis 2: Decentralization of corporate income taxes promotes efficiency and innovative 
competition that encourage economic growth.   
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5. Literature Review of Corporate Tax Rates in Canada 
 
This section described the possibilities of shifting income between different provinces in Canada to 
understand the incentives for competition in corporate income tax rates in the country. It also takes a 
closer look at what the literature says about the relationship between investment and corporate 
income tax rates since it often assumed that lower corporate tax rates leads to more investment.  
Finally it briefly explores if the race-to-the-bottom-argument could be applied to other taxes as well.   
 
 5.1 Income Shifting between Provinces in Canada 
Competition between jurisdictions is crucial when the provincial governments have to consider the 
optimal statutory corporate income tax. Globalization of the world economy has increased 
competition through less transportation and communication costs. The liberalization of capital 
movements has also made it easier to shift income from one jurisdiction to another.  If income is 
easily shifted between jurisdictions there will a tendency towards reporting lower incomes if taxes 
are higher than in other areas (Mintz and Smart, 2003). 
     Income shifting in Canada cannot easily be done for all types of firms, since corporations are not 
allowed to shift income to jurisdictions where they do not have separate affiliates. The firms that 
operate in multiple jurisdictions and do not have separate affiliates have to pay taxes according to a 
national formula that is based on the level of sales in the different jurisdictions. (Mintz and Smart, 
2003). Mintz and Smart (2003) studied the elasticity of income, that is the sensitivity of a change in 
tax rates,  at sub-governmental level in Canada and found that firms that has to report income 
according to a formula are less sensitive to tax rates compared to firms that operate across different 
jurisdictions, but with separate affiliates.  These separated firms are still able to shift income from 
high-tax jurisdictions such as the Atlantic Provinces to a low-tax jurisdiction such as British Colombia. 
The tax rates differ across the province, but in general provinces calculate the taxable income in a 
harmonized way which implies that they also have a common way of determining the distribution of 
the corporate incomes between provinces (Mintz and Smart, 2003).   
     The Government of Canada has fiscal equalization transfers to provinces that have less income 
generating possibilities. These provinces receive an unconditional grant, signifying that they are free 
to spend them in which way they want. The Canadian Constitution Act from 1982 defines that the 
purpose of the transfer is to make sure that all provinces are able to provide a comparable level of 
public services in relationship to their levels of taxation (Department of Finance in Canada, 2011) The 
current recipients for the transfers are; Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
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Québec and Manitoba. One feature of the equalizations transfers that might impact the willingness 
to engage in tax competition is that the amount is determined by the tax base. If tax rates are low, 
then provinces will reduce the amount given in equalization transfers (Mintz and Smart, 2003). 
    
5.2 Is Foreign Direct Investment and Innovation related to Corporate Tax 
Rates? 
When studying the race-to-the-bottom-argument one might first question if there really is a 
relationship between investment and corporate tax rates in Canada. The main reason for cutting 
corporate income tax rates is that these tax cuts will increase FDI, but in order to study FDI one has 
to divide it into inward and outward FDI, investment that flows into respectively out of the country.  
Looking first at inward investment, there are many benefits associated with inward investment, 
including technology transfers, spillover effects and employment in foreign owned companies. 
Employments in these companies are an important part of the manufacturing sector in Canada not 
only because they stands for one third of all the jobs in this sector.  These workers also tend to have 
higher productivity and salary than their domestic employed counterparts (Baldwin and Gu, 2005). 
One fear concerning inward FDI in Canada is that the international firms will purchase domestic firms 
and move their head offices out of the country. In fact there is no evidence for that and it seems like 
firms prefer to have their decision-making closer to its foreign operations (Hajazi, 2010).  
     Hajazi (2010) study the effect of lowering corporate taxes to attract FDI in Canada and shows that 
lowering the corporate income taxes does not attract inward FDI. This shows that in terms of inward 
investment, jurisdictions are racing against each other in a competition that is not even worth 
winning, because even if you do win, you manage to keep the lowest corporate tax rates, you will not 
even receive more investment flows into your jurisdiction. In that sense the second hypothesis does 
not hold, decentralization should not promote economic growth.   
     The research on the effects of outward FDI is more limited than the effects of inward FDI. A 
widespread view is that it leads to the loss of domestic investment and jobs.  This could be true if the 
underlying factors are poor domestic environment such as high taxes and a low-skilled labor force.  
However, when firms are motivated by using their competitive advantages to invest abroad it does 
have a positive effect on the domestic economy (Hejazi, 2010). In that case it seems like corporate 
income taxes can be an important tool to increase outward FDI because it makes domestic firms 
more willing to invest abroad and thereby making them more competitive, supporting the second 
hypothesis.  
      The productivity in Canada has been on a steady level despite heavy investment.  The reason for 
this is according to Lynch and Sheikh (2011) too much concentration on supply-side activities.  A 
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common Canadian firm has a stable production and is very much sheltered from global competition. 
The focus has been to remove factors such as taxes that constrain the firm, rather than increasing 
the demand for new ideas. A lot of new ideas and thoughts generated by investment in education 
have gone to waste as a consequence of the lack of demand of these ideas from firms.  There has not 
been enough competition among firms to create the demand for innovation due to high regulations 
in some sectors, such as the telecom, cultural and financial sector.  Therefore one has to question if 
these regulations are truly worth the costs of loss in productivity that is how efficient a good is 
produced (Lynch and Sheikh, 2011). This suggests that member states should concentrate more on 
increasing the demand on innovative ideas and remove regulation barriers to increase competition. 
The most effective way of increasing competition might not be to lowering corporate income taxes, 
because without the demand for innovation there will be no need for new investments.  However, 
the European countries might be much more exposed to competition than their Canadian 
counterparts and in that case it could still be important to look at supply-side factors as well. The 
limitations of corporate tax cuts alone show that the decentralization of them has to be done in 
combination with other changes and suggests that the second hypothesis might not be that clear-cut.   
     Despite the somewhat negative views of Lynch and Sheikh (2011) of the development of 
innovation incentives and competition in Canada, there are also more positive views.  The 
decentralization in the mid 1990’s is often seen as process that increased efficiency and competition 
in the welfare system through better control of government spending and reductions in debt, but 
also increased incentives for people to work (Clemens et al, 2010, pp.67, 79, 156-157). The 
decentralization process in Canada therefore follows the theory of Montinola et al (1995) of the need 
to control government spending and making local politicians more accountable for the finances.  
5.3 A Race to the Bottom in All Taxes? 
Corporate Tax Rates might be falling, but one can question if the fall in taxes includes all types of 
taxes. In the literature we can find support for a shift in the tax burden from mobile factors to less 
mobile factors such as personal income. Clemens et al (2010, pp. 138) argue for a shift in tax burden 
because  personal and corporate taxes are believed to put higher destructive effects on the economy 
than sales or consumption taxes because they reduce the incentives to invest, save and innovate. 
This contradicts the first hypothesis; EU does not have to be concerned about a race to the bottom 
since lowering corporate income taxes only implies a shift of the tax burden to other groups in 
society.  But of course there could be other reasons then just pure efficiency concerns, such as equity 
and the willingness not to harm individuals that makes taxation of corporations more desirable than 
taxation of labor.   
     Grewal (2010) presents the shares of income taxation in relationship to the total tax revenue, as 
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seen in the table below. This table does show that the federal revenues from personal income have 
increased a lot since 1980, even though the provinces and territories’ revenues have been quite 
stable. Despite the decline in corporate income tax rates there has not been a minor decrease in 
their share of total income taxation. The table indicates that taxation of less mobile factors such as 
labor has increased, but there are no strong indications for that the tax burden has moved away a lot 
from the mobile factor, corporate income tax revenues. 
Table 2: Shares of Income Taxation Revenue in Total Taxation Revenue 
 
 
 
 
Source: Grewal (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
 Personal Income Tax Revenue Corporate Income Tax Revenue 
 Federal Provinces & 
Territories 
Federal Provinces & 
Territories 
1980 39 27 17 8 
2000 46 27 16 8 
2007 48 28 16 7 
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6. Result 
 
This chapter will begin by looking further into the actual historical and current statistics of the 
corporate income tax rate in the member states and the provinces. But statistics and results from the 
interviews is also used to explore if there is a shift going on in the tax burden from more mobile 
factors to less mobile factors. This section also highlights the correlation between FDI and the 
corporate income tax rates that should affect the incentives for competition. It also studies the 
regional differences between provinces and the willingness to cooperate within the country.  
 
 
6.1 Development of Corporate Income Rate in Canada and the EU 
 
Diagram 1: Federal Corporate Income Rate in the Member States and the Provinces 
 
Atlantic provinces: New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador  
Praire province:  Saskatchewan, Manitoba 
Source: (OECD, 2011; Mintz and Smart, 2003; Canada Revenue Agency, 2011; Government of Alberta, 2011) 
All companies in Canada pay a federal and a provincial corporate income tax, the diagram above 
show the combined rate in relationship to the old member states of the EU.  The statistics shows a 
clear trend, namely that the tax rates have continued to fall since the mid 1980’s and this makes it 
easy to think that there is race to the bottom in terms of taxes.  The diagram shows that there is a 
wider variety within the EU, ranging from 13 percent in Ireland to 34 percent in France and Belgium.  
In Canada there is less of a difference between the low-tax jurisdictions and the high-tax 
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jurisdictions.  The Atlantic Provinces have the highest rates of 31 percent and British Colombia has 
the lowest of 27 percent.  Ontario and Québec are the provinces where most economic activity takes 
place and these provinces have the same rate, 29 percent, which makes income shifting between 
provinces not so much of an issue.  British Colombia and Germany have not always been low-tax 
jurisdictions; in fact both had the highest rates in 1999, 45 percent respectively 42 percent. Québec 
used to be a low-tax jurisdiction, but are now at a similar level as the other provinces or one could 
also put it like that the other provinces have followed Québec.  Ireland has a longer history of at least 
having fairly low corporate tax rates, but in 1986 it was also among the highest jurisdictions.  The 
provincial rates may vary across the jurisdictions, but the federal rate, is the same no matter where 
you are.   
 
6.2 Provincial Taxation in Canada 
In Canada there is one higher and one lower rate of corporate tax rates depending on the size of the 
firm.  The rate that was used in the previous diagram shows the general business tax rate and this is 
the higher rate that most firms are subject to. There is also lower rate for small businesses in all 
provinces. 
 
Diagram 2: General Business and Small Business Taxation Rate in Canada 
 
Atlantic provinces: New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador  
Praire province:  Saskatchewan, Manitoba 
Source: (Mintz and Smart, 2003; Canada Revenue Agency, 2011; Alberta, 2011) 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
1986 
1999 
2011 
27 
 
The diagram above shows the small business taxation rate compared to the general business taxation 
rate.  The statistics shows the provincial rates combined with the federal rate, which is 17 percent for 
the higher rate and 11 percent for the lower rate. Alberta and British Colombia have the lowest Small 
Business Taxation Rates of 14 percent and Ontario has the highest rates of 16 percent. Something 
that is not showed in the diagram is that Saskatchewan currently has a 2 percent tax rate and 
Manitoba no provincial corporate income tax at all, suggesting that a race to the bottom is already 
reality in terms of provincial corporate tax in Manitoba. The average General Business Rate is 29 
percent which is more than twice the average of the Small Business Taxation Rate of 14 percent.  All 
provinces have federal collection agreements except Québec and Alberta. This implies that all 
provinces except these two that are not covered by the agreement also have to follow the federal 
government’s definition of taxable income (Canada Revenue Agency, 2011).   
6.3 A Shift in the Tax Burden? 
 In the literature we could find some support for a shift in the tax burden from mobile factors to less 
mobile factors. Leonard supports this, stating that even if there is a race to the bottom going on, it is 
actually not so much of a problem because in the end the tax burden will be moved from the factors 
that are mobile such as firms to factors that are less mobile, that are for example land and labor. 2 
There might be a race to the bottom in corporate income tax, while other taxes on less mobile 
factors remains and even increases in importance. 
Diagram 3: Development of VAT/GST in EU and Canada 
 
Source: OECD (2011), note that the statistics for Canada only shows the federal VAT/GST,  
but there is a provincial tax on top of the federal.  
                                                          
2
 Interview with Mr Leonard, 2011-09-20 
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As indicated by Grewal (2010), a fall in corporate tax rates does not necessary imply a fall in all tax 
rates. Looking  at the statistics for VAT/GST there has been almost no changes since the introduction 
of it in the 1990’s and in some countries there has even been a slight increase, as seen in Diagram 2.   
Diagram 4: Development of Government Revenue (% of GDP) in EU and Canada 
 
Source: WDI (2011) 
If we look at the statistics on government revenue measured as in percentage of GDP in diagram 3, 
there is not much evidence for that the fall in corporate income tax rates has caused a under 
provision of public good.  There has been a slight decrease in the revenues, but overall it seems like 
the governmental revenues have been fairly stable the last years. This suggests that the fall of 
corporate income tax rates have not affects its ability to provide public goods such as health care and 
social services to its citizens.  
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6.4 Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Tax Rates in Canada 
 
 Diagram 5: Development of FDI in relationship to the Corporate Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2011) 
The diagram above shows the development of FDI in Canada the last decades in relationship to a 
combined measure for the corporate income tax rate of the provincial and the federal rate. It 
supports Hejazi (2010) study that there seem to be no relationship between the inflow of investment 
to Canada. There have been big fluctuations in inflow of investment while the corporate income tax 
rate has been decreasing constantly. Both types of FDI seems to be very much related to the financial 
crisis in 2001 and 2008 which is not very surprising considering Canada’s close relationship to the US. 
This close connection could also help to explain why the inflow of investment has experienced 
greater fluctuations than the outflow; most investment in Canada comes from the US while Canadian 
firms might have shifted their investment to other parts of the world instead. The outflow of FDI 
seems to be more correlated with the corporate tax rate, also supporting Hejazi (2010) study. It has 
clearly been affected by the financial crisis, but seems to be rising while corporate income tax rates 
have been falling.  
     One can question if this effect on outward and inward investment can be applied to EU as well. 
Because of the lack of a data on a combined corporate tax rate it is more difficult to study the 
relationship in EU as a whole, even though you can look at specific countries.  If the same pattern 
could be observed in Canada as the EU, the union should be careful about the motive for lowering 
corporate income taxes.  Member states should be careful in lowering their taxes if the aim is to 
increase foreign investment, including investment from other member states, because the 
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relationship seems to be very weak.  However, it could still have a positive effect on the domestic 
investment.  
6.5 Competition or Cooperation between Provinces 
While Lynch and Sheikh (2011) state that innovation forces are very limited in Canada Lee Crowley is 
far more positive.  He believes the decentralization in the mid 1990’s was quite successful because it 
encouraged innovation and experimental forces among the provinces through increased 
competition.  This supports the positive effects of competition such as Besley and Case (1995) idea of 
a “yardstick competition” between jurisdictions. This innovation among the provinces was done 
through lower and less damaging taxes combined with increased competition, once again assuming a 
strong relationship between investment and corporate taxes. 3 
     Despite the sometimes unclear relationship between investment and corporate tax rates, these 
rates have decreased considerably the last decades.  The question is whatever this decrease has 
reached the limit or if we will see an actual race towards no taxation.  Mintz and Smart (2003) shows 
that firms with separate affiliates are more likely to shift income than other firms. They also show 
that tax rates have decreased a lot in Canada the last decades, but they do not go as far as saying 
that there is a race to the bottom going on.  The key informants interviewed in this study did 
generally not make a difference between the firms when discussing tax competition and there 
seemed to be a common view that there was a race to the bottom in terms of corporate income 
taxes. Andrew Jackson4 at the Canadian Labor Congress was worried about the cut of these taxes and 
suggests direct public subsidies instead of taxes. Hardwick5 at the British Colombia Film Commission 
thought that there is most certainly a race to the bottom in taxes for businesses in the film industry 
and did not think that it think that the competition  in the end increased the return of the 
investment. He stated that despite that everyone in the industry realizes that no one benefits from it, 
everyone is playing the game and industries are competing against each other. However, it is also 
important to keep in mind that there are also other important competitive factors such as skilled 
labor force and a good location that influences the location of the firm.6 Harwick’s statement that no 
one benefits from the competition is in line with the first hypothesis, that cooperation should be 
beneficial for everyone.  But as long as there is competition it could also be good for firms because 
they can move to the jurisdiction with the best balance of tax rates and public good such as 
infrastructure in line with the Tiebout model. However, sometimes firms might only shift their 
income to avoid taxation and not their actual location.  
                                                          
3
 Interview with Mr Lee Crowley, 2011-09-12 
4
 Interview with Mr Jackson, 2011-09-14 
5
 Interview with Mr Harwick, 2011-09-26 
6
 ibid 
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    The provision of different levels of public good is one positive outcome of competition, but there 
are also less positive ones such tensions between the three levels of government, something that 
was highlighted more in the interviews than in the literature review.  Canada is very much a 
decentralized country, but the government has quite extensive spending power. The constitution 
allows the federal government to spend money in areas that belongs to the provinces without the 
approval from the provinces themselves, which could cause quite a lot of conflicts. This is usually 
done in terms of conditional transfers, transfers that historically have met a lot of resistance from the 
provinces, especially Québec 7. The provinces often want more autonomy and that the funds from 
the federal government should come without so many obligations attached to it. The country is 
carved up between regions and this creates a lot of competition between the provinces. It is a vast 
country with great distinctions of social development and natural settings8 . This implies that some 
provinces such as British Colombia are very far from Ottawa both in geographical terms and in the 
mind set of the people.  There are also big differences within the provinces themselves. The Canadian 
constitution was written for a time where most people lived in rural areas which also reflected the 
decision making.  But today about 80 percent live in urban settings and there should therefore be a 
shift in power from the municipalities to the cities, because the current system gives 
unproportionate amount of power to the more rural parts.9  However, it seems like most frictions are 
found on provincial level and transfers between regions have become more tensioned politically. 
Alberta is a “have province” and Ontario recently became a “have not province” due to the latest 
financial problems, which changes the dynamics between the provinces. 10 These conflicts show that 
unlike the second hypothesis’s prediction, decentralization might not always lead to more efficient 
governance because it can cause a lot of conflicts between the different local governments. 
     The effect of increased integrated markets and financial crisis could push cooperation in different 
directions. Despite some political tension, provinces have quite recently agreed upon a harmonized 
VAT/GST for commodities. 11 The financial problems that Canada experienced in the 1990’s led to 
further decentralization and encouraged one of the highest economic growths among the G7 
countries between 1997 and 2007.  In the shadow of the current financial crisis EU is very much likely 
to move towards closer coordination and common regulations. This has been the outcome of most 
crises since the 1970’s because each crisis shows that the problems arise in the lack of coordination 
and enforcement of economic rules in an integrated world. The cost of moving away from integration 
has been considered more costly than increasing cooperation. However, cooperation often clashes 
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 Interview with Mr Barber, 2011-09-22 
8
 Interview with Mrs Taillon, 2011-09-12 
9
 Interview with Mr Smith, 2011-09-30 
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 Interview with Mrs Scott, 2011-09-12 
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 Interview with Mr Barber, 2011-09-22 
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with sovereignty and national systems of oversight and coordination. 12 According to Noë13 even 
historical evidence such as the fall of the Roman Empire shows that Europe can never be centralized 
and therefore cooperation can only be extended to a certain extent. Nevertheless it seems like the 
financial crisis in EU has caused more support for the race to the bottom theory.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the “race to the bottom view” in federal or semi-federal states that has 
caused a lot of concern at EU level. Canada’s system of decentralized corporate income tax rates 
seem to be fairly effective and could therefore work as a good indicator for keeping the member 
states autonomy in corporate income tax rates.  The Canadian experience indicates that Montinola et 
al (1995) theory of the importance of increasing efficiency through local governance is true.  A 
decentralized taxation system enables provinces to adjust their tax rates according to their own 
preferences in line with the Tiebout model and encourage positive “yardstick competition” between 
the jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995).  However, the statistics for the last years fall in corporate 
tax rates are quite telling, tax rates are decreasing and one can question if this will cause an under 
provision of public good as the first hypothesis predicts.  
     This papers points at the importance of first looking at the relationship between investment and 
corporate income tax rates.  The result of this study is in line with Hejazi (2010) finding; all types of 
investment in Canada might not be influenced by the corporate income tax rates. Lynch and Sheikh. 
(2011) points at an important factor in terms of increasing investment that was not mentioned in the 
interviews,  that it might be more effective to increase the demand for innovation rather than 
focusing on supply-side factors such as corporate income taxes.  It could also be the case that firms’ 
location are more influenced by agglomeration forces in line with the theory of Baldwin and Krugman 
(2004) and therefore we cannot see a clear relationship between investment and tax rates. But as 
long as the jurisdictions believe that there is a strong relationship between investment and corporate 
tax rates the race will continue, especially for firms that have separate affiliates according to Mintz 
and Smart (2003).  
     Looking at the dramatic decrease of corporate tax rates one cannot help but fearing that the first 
hypothesis is right, rates are falling and we have to cooperate to prevent them from falling to the 
very bottom.  However, Leonard stated that the race to the bottom might only apply to the taxation 
of mobile factors and therefore we will not see a fall in total taxation.  This argument has been 
supported by looking at other taxes.  The development of VAT/GST rates and government revenue 
show that we do not need to worry about an under provision of public good. Grewal (2010) findings 
                                                          
12
 Interview with Mr Noë, 2011-09-06 
13
 ibid 
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support Leonard’s view, but only partly.  His study show an increase in share of the revenue for 
personal income tax, factors that is not very mobile, but it does not reveal any big changes in the 
share of corporate income taxes despite the fall in these tax rates.  .  
     Finally there is strong empirical evidence in favor for the first part of the hypothesis one, but the 
failure of providing sufficient public good will most likely not occur, because the fall in corporate 
rates will be compensated by increased taxation of other less mobile factors. The overall effect of 
decentralization in Canada seems to be increased efficiency, while the degree of innovation forces 
has to be investigated further, supporting the first half of hypothesis number two. The Canadian 
example of provincial autonomy of tax rates, but harmonizing the tax base seems to function as a 
role model for the EU. This suggests that the CCCTB formula could be quite successful, but the 
cooperation should stay there and not go any further and harmonize corporate tax rates.  
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9.  Appendix  
9.1 Results from Interviews 
The table shows some of the key results from the interviews, each number in the table corresponds 
to the number of each expert in the table for “Oral Sources”. 
 x -  means “yes” 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
"There is a lot of competition between jurisdictions in Canada”   x x       x   x 
"The decentralization process in Canada has increased efficiency”       x x         
"Increased integration of markets has caused jurisdictions to         x x       
 cooperate more on corporate taxes”                   
“There are a lot of tensions between different jurisdictions in Canada” x           x x x 
“A race to the bottom is not a problem”       x           
“A race in taxes have very negative effects”   x x             
“Falling corporate income tax rates has not led to more investment”     x             
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9. 2.  Appendix Map of Canada 
 
 
 
Source: (Trail Canada) 
 
